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Abstract
The notion of social possibility is, in many respects, central to the conceptual foun-
dations of modern social theory. This thesis draws upon results from possible worlds
semantics and modal logics of knowledge to develop a framework for reasoning about
social possibility and the epistemic states of social agents. The framework is then
used to reason about the cognitive structure and emancipatory character of critical
theories. The thesis concludes with an examination of the notion of social possibil-
ity in light of recent social thought, with particular emphasis on Roberto Unger's
Politics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Human inquiry into the essence and character of social reality is an exercise whose out-
come is necessarily fragmented and disjoint. Modern social theory-broadly construed-
is comprised of a diverse range of disciplines and worldviews, each of which seeks to
arrive at alternative ways of describing, explaining, and representing social phenom-
ena. Once thought of in largely social-historical terms, modern social theory is now
seen to encompass a range of conceptual schemes and frameworks, each characterized
by differing theoretical and empirical components.
At a foundational level, modern social theory is comprised of both descriptive and
normative components, each of which contributes to our understanding of society,
social phenomena, and human capability. The descriptive component of social theory
seeks to provide plausible descriptions and explanations of collective action and the
functioning of social systems. In contrast, the normative component of social theory
seeks to advance alternative conceptions of society and politics. Together, these two
components comprise what can be referred to as the is and the ought of social-
theoretic discourse and analysis.
Consistent with this characterization, a pervasive theme in the foundations of
social theory is the so-called micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro problem.' The
micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro problem concerns the relation between (i) indi-
1See, e.g., James Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory [5]. Cf. Coleman [6] and Rawls [29].
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Figure 1-1: The micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro transition.
vidual action; and (ii) the functioning of social systems. As figure 1-1 illustrates, the
relation between individual action and social system behavior is symbiotic in char-
acter: Individual action influences the behavior of the social system, which, in turn,
influences or constrains individual action. This transition-from micro-to-macro and
macro-to-micro-is a characteristic feature of contemporary social-theoretic discourse
and analysis.2
Inquiries into the micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro problem often lead social
theorists to advance conceptual frameworks and proposals aimed at enabling agents
to achieve a broad range of goals, such as emancipation, equality, and justice. The op-
erational means by which to achieve such broadly conceived social goals is to motivate
or give rise to individual and collective action that is purposive in character. In this
way, social theory takes on a programmatic character, and draws upon both descrip-
tive and explanatory accounts of phenomenal and social experience, as well as upon
normative insights into society and politics. The interaction between the normative,
the descriptive, and the programmatic components of social theory is illustrated in
Figure 1-2.
Broadly construed, programmatic social theory seeks to provide agents with al-







Figure 1-2: The interaction between the normative, the descriptive, and the program-
matic components of modern social theory.
ternative directions and paths for social and political transformation. Programmatic
social theory therefore seeks to provide plausible accounts of what is, in effect, possible
within a particular social order. To this end, programmatic social theory ultimately
seeks to put forth and defend views concerning the desirability or preferability of one
possible social world over another. By identifying and characterizing specific social
desires or needs-some or all of which may or may not be known to the social agents
in question-programmatic social theory endeavors to create conceptual frameworks
and schemes whereby alternatives concerning different conceptions of, and proposals
for, social transformation can be evaluated in such a way as to ultimately motivate
or give rise to intentional action.
Central to this characterization of programmatic social theory is the notion of
social possibility. For our purposes here, the notion of social possibility is used to
convey a sense of what is potentially realizable in a particular social order. At a
foundational level, the notion of social possibility underlies our conceptualization of
the options that social agents take to be open to them at any one time. In this way,
the notion of social possibility underlies our most basic and fundamental conceptions
of human agency and purposive action. The notion of social possibility therefore
serves as a conceptual bridge between individual action, on the one hand, and social
system behavior, on the other.
This thesis puts forth and defends a conception of social possibility that is markedly
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epistemic in character. In the theoretical framework that is developed, the knowledge
or epistemic states of social agents is taken as a central and inalienable element of
human agency. From this vantage point, human judgement and cognition is seen,
ultimately, to provide the bases for what agents hold to be socially possible.
An epistemic grounding of the notion of social possibility such as the one put forth
here can be justified on several fronts. First, insofar as the notion of purposive action
entails some form of deliberation or intentionality on the part of social agents, it
seems reasonable to suppose that the notion of social possibility must be predicated
on a theory of human judgement or cognition. At a base level, human judgement
provides the necessary abstract relational structures and inference mechanisms that
allow social agents to discern and make sense of possible alternatives and possible
courses of action.
Perhaps the most compelling justification that can be made for an epistemic
grounding of the notion of social possibility is that in order to arrive at plausible
accounts and explanations of human agency and the functioning of social systems, it
is necessary to somehow isolate, make reference to, or represent the epistemic states
of the social agents in question. Only in this way is it possible to speak meaningfully
about the interests, wants, and preferences of social agents.
Of course, an epistemic grounding of the notion of social possibility is but one way
to speak meaningfully about the interests, wants, and preferences of social agents. For
instance, it is worth noting that according to the so-called ontological viewpoint, so-
cial science must, at a base level, endeavor to focus on the attitudes, emotions, and
subjective dispositions of social agents. In this regard, the differences that might sepa-
rate an ontological conception of social possibility versus an epistemic conception are,
for the most part, subtle and will not concern us here. Clearly, in the absence of some
manner in which to describe or represent the knowledge, wants, and preferences of so-
cial agents, the notion of deliberative action loses much of its commonsense meaning
and connotation. If we reject an epistemically or ontologically grounded conception of
social possibility and, in the process, rid ourselves of wants and preferences, then de-
liberative action ceases to be purposive in character, and instead takes on a seemingly
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Epistemic Wants and Possible Deliberative
State Preferences Worlds Action
Figure 1-3: The relation between knowledge and information, wants and preferences,
possible worlds, and deliberative action.
haphazard or random character. Such views are most closely akined to the so-called
behaviorist program in social theory, which-in its most radical form-eliminates all
references to belief, knowledge, purpose, and meaning in social-theoretic discourse
and analysis.
The essence of the conception of social possibility that is advanced in this thesis
can be summarized along the following lines. First, at any one time, our perception or
understanding of what is socially possible can be construed as constituting a subset
of our total corpus of knowledge and information about the social universe. This
knowledge and information is seen to influence the manner and way in which social
agents arrive at and express wants and preferences within a particular social order.
If knowledge of and about the social universe serves, ultimately, as the basis upon
which agents arrive at judgements as to what is socially possible, then implicit in
this characterization is the assumption that some social worlds may, in fact, not be
possible given an agent's current state of knowledge and information about the social
universe. Finally, it is from these judgements about what is socially possible that
deliberative action-both individual and collective-ultimately stems. These ideas
are illustrated in Figure 1-3.
This thesis represents an attempt to bring together various conceptual and theo-
retical strands relating to the notion of social possibility. In particular, an important
objective of the thesis is to isolate what appear-at first glance-to be divergent
claims and points of view concerning the notion of social possibility. To this end, the
thesis identifies those areas where there is consistency and complementarity among
what appear, on the surface, to be rival viewpoints and traditions. Chapter 2 of the
thesis draws upon results from possible worlds semantics and modal logics of knowl-
1
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edge to develop a framework for reasoning about social possibility and the epistemic
states of social agents. The central objective of this chapter is to go beyond the
broadly sketched conceptual frameworks that social theorists have, in the past, used
to talk about the notion of social possibility. Chapter 3 establishes a formal link
between the broadly construed, abstract frameworks that underlie critical theories of
society and politics and the logical framework put forth in Chapter 2. The motivation
for pursuing this line of inquiry stems from the fact that critically-oriented theories
are primarily concerned with those facets of social reality that impose fundamental
limits on human options and potential through domination and oppression [14]. As
interesting and thought-provoking as some of this body of work has been, much of it
has, nevertheless, remained at a level of abstraction that has thus far made it diffi-
cult for scholars to interpret concrete historical events and to arrive at programmatic
proposals for social and political transformation. Chapter 4 widens the scope of the
analysis, and examines the notion of social possibility in the broader context of re-
cent social thought, with particular emphasis on Roberto Unger's brilliantly conceived
Politics [34, 35]. The thesis concludes in Chapter 5 with a tentative assessment of
the relevance of the ideas and concepts set forth here for modern social theory.
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Chapter 2
The Logic of Possibility
The role of formal logic and mathematics in social-theoretic discourse and analysis
is a topic that is fraught with controversy and debate. Much of the controversy that
surrounds this issue can ultimately be traced to fundamental and long-standing dis-
putes about the nature of society and the social sciences. On this point, two salient
views emerge from the literature. One view holds that analytical formalism should
play a central role in our attempts to understand and describe the vast complexities of
social reality. In fact, a dominant view in contemporary social science is that descrip-
tion and explanation should be conducted and represented in terms of concepts and
frameworks that lend themselves, ultimately, to mathematical expression. However,
a competing view maintains that meaning and subjectivity are central and inalienable
components of social life, and that, for this reason, the social sciences must be seen to
differ in fundamental respects from the physical sciences. According to this particular
view, mathematical formalism can play little more than an ancillary role in our best
efforts to comprehend the social universe.
Clearly, there can seem to be a tensions between these two views. This chapter lays
the foundations for a theory of social possibility that seeks to strike an instrumental
balance between these two opposing viewpoints. In particular, the chapter puts forth
a systematic framework for reasoning about social possibility and the epistemic states
of social agents. The logical framework that is presented draws upon results from
possible worlds semantics and modal logics of knowledge. This logical framework
I
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can be interpreted as an initial attempt to probe the applicability of these formal
concepts to social-theoretic discourse and analysis. In what follows, the basic elements
of the possible worlds model are introduced. As part of this discussion, various
formal properties of knowledge and their relevance to social theory are considered. In
the subsequent chapter, we examine the potential relevance of formal logic in social
theorizing. In particular, the possible worlds model put forth in this chapter is used to
reason about the cognitive structure and emancipatory character of critical theories.
2.1 Possible Worlds Model
The commonsense notion of possibility is, in many respects, both vague and abstract.
One consequence of this ambiguity is that the word "possibility" often takes on dif-
ferent meanings and connotations, depending on the situation or context in which
it is used. As outlined in Chapter 1, our purpose here is to arrive at a formal and
rigorous conception of the notion of social possibility, one that serves, ultimately, the
social-scientific purposes to which the everyday notion is put.
The modal concept of possibility has long been a topic of interest to logicians
and philosophers, alike. A widely held conception of possibility proceeds from the
assumption that the world can be in a number of possible states, one of which is
the state of the actual world. In this way, besides the true state of affairs, there are
a number of other possible states of affairs or possible worlds. Typically, intelligent
agents do not have enough information to be able to tell with certainty which world
among these possible worlds is the actual world. This is the essence of the so-called
possible worlds model, which, in recent years, has been applied successfully in a
diverse range of disciplines, including artificial intelligence,' economics,2 linguistics, 3
and political science.4
1See, e.g., Genesereth and Nilsson [12] and Moore [26].
2See, e.g., Bicchieri and Chiara [4], Parikh [28], and Samet [30].
3See, e.g., van Bentham [3].
4 Two decades ago, in a much-neglected book, Jon Elster [8] attempted to explore the potential
role of quantified modal logic in social-theoretic discourse and analysis. Elster's book was written
with the intention of demonstrating the practical role that abstract logic could play in helping social
M
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2.1.1 Possible Worlds Syntax and Semantics
Reasoning about the epistemic states of social agents requires that we make reference
to a formal language of some kind. Suppose that we have a group consisting of n social
agents, labelled 1,..., n. In the possible worlds model, we assume that the agents
reason about a social reality or universe that is described in terms of a nonempty
set 4) of primitive propositions, which we label p, q, r, etc. In order to describe the
epistemic states of the n agents, we augment our formal language by defining a modal
operator Ki, where Kip denotes "social agent i knows i," for i = 1,..., n. In using
the primitive propositions in 4J to reason about their social reality, we assume that
agents are able to form more complicated formulas by closing off under conjunction,
negation, and the modal operators K 1,..., K,.
The notion of possible worlds is a central element of most model-building exercises.5
The possible worlds model sketched above has, during the course of the past decade,
found considerable use in the fields of artificial intelligence and epistemology. 6 A
central theme in much of this work is that the notion of possibility can, in some
respects, be viewed as the dual of knowledge. Specifically, in a given state, the more
worlds that a social agent considers possible, the less knowledge he is said to have.
In principle, then, an agent's state of knowledge allows him to differentiate between
various possible social worlds. The formal relation between knowledge and possibility
can therefore be stated as follows: An agent is said to know a fact p if and only if p is
scientists pose and answer questions in ways that they might not otherwise have pursued. In writing
the book, Elster had hoped that the use of modal logic in social inquiry would give rise to new
theories of, and approaches to, social science. Several reasons can be singled out for why Elster's
project was largely unsuccessful. First, it is important to recognize the historical context in which
this particular work rests. Two decades ago, when Elster's book was published, social theory was, as
a discipline, distancing itself from approaches to discourse and analysis that were based on analytical
theorizing. At the time, a good deal of scholarship focused on hermeneutic theory, as well as upon
critically-oriented studies. In this setting, mathematical and logical formalism was largely eschewed
in favor of alternative forms of analysis and argumentation. It is important to recognize, also, that
while the field of modal logic had, by the 1970s, made important advances, the direct relevance and
usefulness of these tools, concepts, and techniques were not as large and significant as they perhaps
needed to be in order to attract widespread interest among social theorists.
5Possibilistic reasoning underlies our most basic conceptions of judgement, deliberation, and
rationality. For an insightful discussion of this point, see Levi [21].
6See, e.g., Fagin et al. [9] and Giirdenfors [11].
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true at all the worlds that he considers possible. In this way, knowledge is construed
as being an all or nothing affair; If there is at least one possible world where 9 does
not hold, i.e., where p is false, then the agent cannot be said to have knowledge of p.
In a given state, an agent will consider some social worlds to be possible and
others not. Possible worlds are therefore not seen as possible tout court, but rather as
possible relative to a particular state or set of states. A logical construct known as a
Kripke structure provides a convenient means by which to capture this intuition and
to give our language a formal semantics. A Kripke structure for n agents is a tuple
M = (S, 71, KI, . . ., ,Kn) 
,
where S denotes a set of states or possible worlds, 7 maps each state s E S and each
primitive proposition p C 1 to a truth assignment,7 and ICi is a binary relation on
the states of S, for i = 1,..., n.
The truth assignment 7r allows us to capture the contextual nature of truth. Specif-
ically, for each state s E S, 7 tells us whether p G 1 is true or false in state s.
The binary relation Ki is, in effect, a possibility relation for agent i. In particular,
(s, t) E K/i if agent i considers world t possible, given his information in world s.
The assignment of truth values to propositions is an important element of any
logical system. In possible worlds semantics, we define a binary relation, =, between
a formula p and a pair (M, s) that consists of a Kripke structure M and a state s in
M. The clause (M, s) = ý is read "p is true at (M, s)," and is defined as follows:
(M,s) = p (pCG 4) iff 7r(s)(p) =true,
(M, s) W pA ? iff (M,s) ý= and (M,s)I= ,
(M,s) I-- p iff (M,s) •=p.
Readers familiar with propositional logic will recognize these three clauses as the
7 Formally, this mapping is defined as wr(s) : 4 -+ {true, false}, for each state s E S.
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standard logical definition of truth. To complete our definition of the binary relation
@, we add the following clause to the three that are listed above:
(M, s) ý Kilo iff (M, t) V Vt - (s, t) E 1K.
This clause states that agent i knows so in state s of structure M if and only if so is
true at all worlds i considers possible in s. In this way, by conceptually linking the
function 7r and the binary relation KCi, we are able to characterize knowledge in terms
of both truth value assignments and possibility relations.
Using possible worlds semantics, it is possible to decide whether a formula is true
at a given world. In general, we recognize that some formulas are always true, while
others are only sometimes true. It is a relatively simple matter to formalize these
intuitions using the possible worlds framework. Specifically, we say that a formula
p is valid in M, which we denote by M ý sp, if (M, s) = so for every state s in S.
Alternatively, if (M, s) = so for some state s in S, then s is said to be satisfiable
in M. More generally, a formula p is said to be valid, which we denote by 1= s, if
it is valid in all structures. Similarly, so is said to be satisfiable if it is valid in some
structure.
2.2 Formal Properties of Knowledge
The possible worlds model presented above provides a formal means with which to
reason about social possibility. Within this framework, we are able to render concrete
the notion that given any social order or state, there exists a set of states that are
socially possible with respect to that state. In addition, the modal operator Ki
provides a formal means by which to represent the epistemic states of social agents.
We now examine some of the formal properties that are typically associated with the
modal operator Ki.
We begin with two pairs of axioms for knowledge and inference, respectively: 8
8 Together, these axioms and rules of inference comprise what Halpern and Moses [15] call the
1
All instances of propositional tautologies;
(Kjc A Ki (o > 0)) K i = 1, ... , n;
From p and p =: >, infer 0;
From 'p, infer Kip.
Propositional tautologies are, of course, central elements of any formal, axiomatic
system. In this respect, the first axiom above specifies that all instances of tautologies
of the propositional calculus are valid. The second axiom-typically called the dis-
tribution axiom-states that each social agent knows all of the logical consequences
of his knowledge. The third axiom is, of course, quickly recognized as modus ponens.
Lastly, the fourth axiom states that if p is true, then agent i knows that it is true.
It is important to recognize that, together, these axioms and rules of inference
posit the existence of idealized social agents that know all of the consequences of their
knowledge and, moreover, know all things that are true. In this respect, the agents
are assumed to be capable of perfect reasoning. Naturally, real-world social agents
are typically characterized by imperfect reasoning, in that, at any one time, they
may violate one or more of the above axioms and rules of inference. This observation
notwithstanding, our concern here lies primarily with the normative adequacy of these
axioms, as well as the degree to which this logical formalism provide a useful means
with which to reason about social possibility and the epistemic states of social agents.
Naturally, substantive extensions to the basic theory put forth here would need to
account for the cognitive limitations of social agents.
The classic conception of knowledge is as true, justified belief.' Under this in-
terpretation, an agent cannot have knowledge about something that is, in actuality,
axiom system Kn.
9 Horwich [18] provides a particularly lucid account of the relation between knowledge and truth.
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false. In this way, only true facts can be known [15].10 This requirement is typically
formalized in terms of the knowledge axiom
Kilo =* o, i . n,
which states that if agent i knows cp, then V must be true.
We now turn to two axioms that relate to issues of meta-knowledge, i.e., knowledge
about knowledge. The first of these axioms is the positive introspection axiom, which
is stated as follows:
Kilo t KiKVo, i = 1,..., n.
What this axiom states is that if social agent i knows p, then he knows that he knows
,o. Stated more generally, an agent knows what facts he knows. The analogue of this
axiom is the so-called negative introspection axiom, which is defined as follows:
•Kico =: Kj--Ki(p, i = 1,... n.
This axiom states that if agent i does not know p, then he knows that he does not
know po. In this way, an agent knows precisely what facts he does not know V [15].
Another common axiom of knowledge is
-Ki (false),
which states that an agent cannot know inconsistent facts.
Modal logicians have used these axioms-and a host of others"--to arrive at
various conceptions and formal characterizations of knowledge. Using the axioms
presented above, it is possible to prove the following theorem, which we state here
10Consistent with this conception of knowledge, Genesereth and Nilsson [12] argue that while
agents can have false beliefs, the notion of false knowledge is devoid of useful meaning.
"
1 For presentations of alternative logics for knowledge and belief, see, e.g., Hughes and Cress-
well [19], Mints [25], and Wansing [36].
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without proof.12
Theorem 1 For all formulas p and 4, all structures M, and all agents i = 1,..., n,
1. M • (Kip A Ki (cp 0 )) => Ki ;
2. If M ýp, then M Kip;
3. M2 Kpo = op;
4. M - Koip K iKip;
5. M 1 Kip = Ki-Ki(p.
2.3 Common Knowledge
In situations where there are two or more social agents, it is often useful to be able to
say something about facts that everyone in a particular group knows. Along similar
lines, it is also useful to be able to represent situations where a particular fact is
common knowledge among a group of agents. In simple terms, common knowledge
refers to those facts that "any fool knows" [9]. More specifically, it is easy to envision
situations where everyone knows that everyone knows a particular fact. This type
of "second-order" knowledge can be generalized to include facts that everyone knows
that everyone knows that everyone knows them, and so on.
In formalizing these notions, we augment our language with the addition of two
modal operators, E and C, where E'p denotes "everyone knows p," and C'p denotes
"p is common knowledge." The formula Ep is true if and only if every agent i knows
ýp, for i = 1,..., n.13 This characterization motivates the following axiom:
ý EWp - Klp A ... A Knp .
Similarly, the formula Csp represents the infinite conjunction
12For a simple proof, see, Fagin et al. [9].
13Note that in the single-agent case, E•p - Kp.
I
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Eý A EEgp A .--.
For the modal operators E and C, given a Kripke structure M, we define
(M, s) E iff (M, s) Kjp for all i = 1, 2,..., n,
(M, s) = Cc iff (M, s) Ekcp for k = 1, 2,...,
where E'cp = Eýp and Ek+1±l = E (Ek p), for k > 1.
Using the above axiomatization of the modal operators E and C, the following
theorem is easily proved. 14
Theorem 2 For all formulas cp and 4, all structures M, and all agents i = 1,..., n,
1. M Ep @ (KjP A ... A Kn);
2. M C(p E (cp A C);
3. If M ý p E (0 A p), then M ýp * Co4 .
The first part of this theorem follows directly from the semantics of the modal oper-
ator E. The second part of the theorem allows us to minimize the effects of bounded
rationality.'5 In particular, since CVp _ E (c A CV), social agents are freed from hav-
ing to learn the facts Ep, Ep 2 ,..., etc. in an individual fashion. The last part of
the theorem-sometimes called the induction rule-provides a formal mechanism for
deducing that common knowledge holds in a given structure [15].
14A straightforward proof is found in Halpern and Moses [15].
15Simon [31] provides a concise introduction to the notion of bounded rationality.
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2.4 Distributed Knowledge
The last concept that we consider in this chapter is that of distributed knowledge. As
its name implies, the motivation behind this concept is to describe situations where
knowledge is, in effect, distributed within a group. If, for example, each social agent
in a group knows a different fact, then the distributed knowledge of the group is the
knowledge we would have if it were possible to somehow aggregate or combine the
individual knowledge of all the agents. For example, consider a situation where there
are two social agents. Suppose that one agent knows V, and that the other agent
knows V =* 0. Using modus ponens, it is clear that knowledge of V is distributed
among the two agents. The notion of distributed knowledge therefore provides a
conceptual means with which to describe the total or combined knowledge of a group
of agents.
In formalizing our intuitions about distributed knowledge, we augment our lan-
guage with a modal operator D, which, given a Kripke structure M, we define se-
mantically as follows:
(M,s) = Dcp iff (M,t) j=o for all t 9 (s,t) E KCl n... n)C.
What this definition states is that distributed knowledge of ýo at state s of structure
M requires that social agents combine their knowledge in such a way that the only
worlds that they consider possible are those that are in the intersection of the set of
worlds that each agent, individually, considers possible [15].
As before, we can specify axioms for the modal operator D that allow us to further
refine our intuitions about distributed knowledge. One axiom that is commonly put
forth is
K1p Dp, i = 1 ,...,n.
This axiom states that if a group of n social agents know a fact ýo, then, collectively,
they have distributed knowledge of p. Analogous to the case for the modal operator
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Ki, it is easily shown that the following inference rule is valid:
Dp A D (W =* 0) =* DO.
Finally, we state the following inference rule for distributed knowledge:
S(V A--.. A n) => W (K==  A ...' A Kgnn) =>. DW.
This rule states that if the finite conjunction V1 A ... A 4, implies c, and if agent i
knows Oi (for i = 1, ... , n), then, collectively, the agents have distributed knowledge
of W.
2.5 Summary
The foregoing discussion put forth some of the rudimentary building blocks of possible
worlds semantics and modal logics of knowledge. Our main intent has been to set the
stage for a consideration of the potential applicability of these concepts for social-
theoretic discourse and analysis. The following chapter seeks to establish connections
between the formal concepts put forth above and key concepts in the area of critical
theory.
Chapter 3
An Application to Critical Theory
In the late twentieth century, critical theory has emerged as a distinct and impor-
tant subfield of modern social theory.' Conceptually, critical theorists argue that
positivism-as a distinct and discernible mode of thought-gives rise to reified world
views that construe the status quo and existing social orders as the way the social uni-
verse must necessarily be [14]. In this respect, critical theorists hold that positivism
is fundamentally limited in its ability to give rise to alternatives to the prevailing
social order. In contrast, a defining feature of critical theories is their emancipatory
character. That is, critical theories are intended to give rise to processes of enlight-
enment and emancipation within a particular social order. This enlightenment and
emancipation process is generally viewed as a transition from some initial state of
bondage, delusion, frustration, or suffering to some final state of freedom, knowledge,
or satisfaction [13].
The structure and content of critical theories typically take the form of program-
matic proposals that seek to impart or give rise to a reflective capacity that allows
social agents to come to a better or, perhaps, truer understanding of what their inter-
ests and desires are. Such modes of social discourse and explanation seek, ultimately,
to open the door for heightened forms of emancipation and enlightenment, as well as
'For an insightful historical overview of the conceptual evolution of critical theory, see, e.g.,
Honneth [17]. An excellent account of the historical and conceptual foundations of critical theory is
found in Morrow and Brown [27].
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to achieve freedom from coercive forms of power and control over human affairs.
While, conceptually, these are, noble aims indeed, in practice much of critical the-
ory is derided by social theorists as reducing to little more than pessimistic critiques of
existing social orders or, alternatively, to "hopelessly naive utopias" [33]. In this way,
argues Jonathan Turner, critical theorists "generate formulations which often have
little foundation in the operative dynamics of the universe" [33, p. 160]. Consistent
with this criticism, Thomas Wilson adds that "the critics of 'scientific' social science
appear to argue directly or indirectly for a vague and unsatisfactory idealism, sub-
jectivism, or even outright ideologizing" [37, p. 386]. Of course, such comments only
begin to scratch the surface of the broader set of issues and debates that surround
the question of what should be the aims and methods of social science. Clearly, it
is possible to distinguish between those who view critical theory as overly ideological
and idealized, on the one hand, and those who feel that most (if not all) analytical
theorizing in the social sciences represents a misguided effort to arrive at better un-
derstandings of social reality, on the other. In this chapter, an attempt is made to
mitigate the seeming tension that exists between these two opposing viewpoints. In
particular, we apply the logical framework put forth previously in Chapter 2 to an
analysis of the cognitive structure and emancipatory character of critical theories.
3.1 Critical Theory and Social Possibility
At a foundational level, critical theories seek to provide agents with alternative con-
ceptions of what is potentially realizable in a particular social order. In this way, the
notion of social possibility clearly underlies our conceptions of, and approaches to, the
idea of a critical theory. In outlining this general view, Raymond Geuss argues that
critical theories must show "that a transition from the present state of society ... to
some proposed final state is 'objectively' or 'theoretically' possible" [13, p. 76]. In
addition, says Geuss, the proposed final state must be shown to be "inherently possi-
ble" [13, p. 76]. Possibilistic reasoning is therefore central to the cognitive structure
and emancipatory character of critical theories.
Chapter 3. An Application to Critical Theory
Insofar as critical theories attempt to reduce the amount of identifiable suffering in
a particular social order, it is important to accurately characterize the initial state of
suffering of the social agents in question. Geuss outlines three possible configurations
for this initial state [13]:
1. The social agents know that they are suffering and are aware of the social
institutions or arrangements that are causing their suffering;
2. The social agents know that they are suffering, but they are unaware of the
causes of their suffering;
3. The social agents are in an apparent state of contentment, but, in actuality,
they are suffering from ideological delusions that keep them from recognizing
their true state of suffering.
Clearly, the epistemic states of social agents play an important role in the character-
ization of the possible configurations for the initial state of suffering. In particular,
social agents are characterized as either having or lacking knowledge about their ini-
tial state. In addition, agents are also characterized in terms of their awareness, or
lack thereof, of the cause(s) of their suffering.
3.2 Reasoning About the Cognitive Structure and
Emancipatory Character of Critical Theories
As stated previously, the emancipatory process that critical theories seek to give rise
to can be construed as a multi-step transition from some initial state to some final
state. The direction that this transition takes depends upon the epistemic states of
the social agents in question. Specifically, if social agents do not know that they are
suffering, a critical theory must enlighten the agents in such a way as to give rise
to a state where they have knowledge of their suffering. In a similar fashion, agents
may be unaware of the causes of their suffering. Such instances require that a critical
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theory give rise to or impart a reflective capacity that enables social agents to develop
an awareness or understanding of what these causes are.
In using the possible worlds model put forth previously in Chapter 2 to formalize
these features of critical theory, we begin by defining a Kripke structure M over a
nonempty set 4PCT of primitive propositions, which are taken here to comprise or
otherwise define the structure and content of our critical theory. As before, we can
construct more complicated formulas by closing off the primitive propositions in #CT
under conjunction, negation, and the modal operators K 1,..., K,.
Defining a n-agent Kripke structure M over 4CT requires that we specify the set S
of possible social worlds, the primitive propositions of (CT, the truth assignment 7r,
and the accessibility relations KIC,... , Kn.
For our purposes here, the finite set S of possible social worlds is comprised of
three states, which we define as follows:
S = {s1, s2, S3 ,
where
def
s1 = Agent is in a state of suffering, the cause of which is C;
def
s2 = Agent is in a state of suffering;
def
s3 = Agent is content, enlightened, and emancipated.
In terms of the above characterization, each of the n social agents can, at any
one time, be in one of three possible states: sl, s2, or s 3. In order to represent these
states in a simple and concise fashion, we define the following indicator variable:
1, if agent i is in state si,
xi 2, if agent i is in state s2,
3, if agent i is in state s3.
The n social agents thus give rise to an n-tuple (xl,... , x), which, at any one time,
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is in one of 3" states.
Suppose, for the purposes of illustration, that the critical theory under consider-
ation consists of two primitive propositions, pi and qj, which we define as follows:
defPi = Agent i is suffering;
qi = Agent i's source of suffering is C.
The function ir can now be defined as follows:
(M, s) = (M, (x 1,...,xn)) • Pi iff xi = 1 or xi = 2,
(M, s) = (M, (x,...,xn)) f qi iff xi = 1.
With the exception of defining the accessibility relations C1,... , KCn, we are now
in a position to use the possible worlds model to reason about the cognitive structure
and emancipatory character of critical theories. For ease of exposition, we focus here
on the single-agent case.2
In what follows, we use the possible worlds model to reason about two types of
situations that can arise in the emancipatory process:
* The situation where the social agent knows that he is suffering;
* The situation where the agent is in a state of delusion.
Let us begin by trying to capture the situation where the social agent is in a
state of delusion. Recall that in this state, the agent believes that he is not suffering
when, in actuality, he is. It is a simple matter to capture this situation using the
logical framework put forth above. Specifically, for our structure M-partially defined
above-this situation can arise in one of two ways:
2In the single-agent case, we abbreviate (M, (xl)) = (M, (1)) as (M, 1), (M, (xl)) = (M, (2))




As defined previously, (M, 1) = --Kp if and only if (M, t) = p for at least one t
such that (1, t) E C.3 A similar situation holds for (M, 2) = -K,. In general, these
two relations hold if there is at least one world the agent considers possible in state 1
and state 2, respectively, where p does not hold. The question, then, of whether the
social agent is in a state of delusion becomes a matter of how the agent defines the
possibility relation K in structure M.
In defining the possibility relation K: in structure M, suppose, for example, that
in state 1, the social agent considers state 3 possible. The rationale for this might
proceed along the following lines. In state 1, the agent is suffering, and is aware of the
cause(s) of his suffering. From this vantage point, the agent can either be optimistic or
pessimistic about his future possible social worlds. If the agent is optimistic, then he
considers emancipation from his suffering possible. State 2, however, is ruled out as a
possibility, as that would entail a loss of information about the causes of his suffering.
Now, since ir(1)(p) = true and 7r (3)(p) = false, it follows that (M, 1) ý -'Kp. We
see that since the agent's knowledge is such that there is a world he considers possible
where p is false, he cannot be said to have knowledge of p. If, instead of adopting
a position of optimism, the agent were to adopt a position of extreme pessimism,
thereby holding that in state 1 there are no other possible social worlds, then we have
that (M, 1) = Kp. In this case, knowledge can be seen to come at a cost, namely, the
emancipatory vision of the social agent.
In what way is the situation any different for (M, 2) ý -'Kp ? As before, we
first delineate what social worlds the agent considers possible in state 2. Suppose, for
example, that given his information in state 2, the agent considers state 1 possible.
3Recall that (M, 1) ý p (for p E () if and only if ir(1)(p) = true. Also, recall that (s, t) E IC if
and only if the social agent considers world t possible, given his information in world s.
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In this way, the agent considers it possible to move from a state where he has no
information about the cause(s) of his suffering to a state where he does have such
information. Suppose, further, that the agent does not consider state 3 possible, given
his information in state 2, the reason being that he must, as mentioned previously,
have information about the causes of his suffering before a critical theory can give rise
to a process of emancipation. Thus, for this particular characterization, we have that
7r(2)(p) = true and that r(1))(p) = true. Consequently, it follows that (M, 2) V --Kp
or, alternatively, that (M, 2) ý Kp. Implicit in this characterization is an inherent
optimism on the part of the social agent that a process of enlightenment can take
place in such a way as to give rise to a state of awareness of the cause(s) of his
suffering.
We now briefly examine two other knowledge relations. Using the same Kripke
structure M defined above, it follows that (M, 1) = Kq, which simply says that when
the actual situation is state 1, the agent knows that the cause(s) of his suffering is
(are) C. The rationale here is that in state 1, the agent considers state 3 possible.
Thus, since r(1)(q) = true and 7r(3)(q) = true, the result follows directly. By stating
that the agent considers state 3 possible, given his information in state 1, we implicitly
assume that he would, as part of the emancipation process, retain his knowledge of
the cause(s) of his suffering. Using a similar line of reasoning, it is a simple matter to
verify that when the actual situation is state 2, we have that (M, 2) = -'Kq, which
agrees with our intuition.
3.3 Summary
The preceding discussion put forth a detailed illustration of how the notion of social
possibility can be seen to underlie several concepts that are central to the concep-
tual foundations of critical theory. Our modest attempt at utilizing possible worlds
semantics and modal logic to represent formally the cognitive structure and emanci-
patory character of critical theories suggests that useful conceptual linkages can be
drawn between logical analysis and reasoning on the one hand, and broad concep-
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tual frameworks, on the other. Use of the logical framework set forth in Chapter 2
has allowed us a formal means by which to clarify and represent critically-oriented
concepts that have heretofore been presented in vague and ambiguous terms. The
approach adopted here allows a convenient means by which to represent and probe a
problematic set of issues and concepts that have previously been difficult to analyse
or discuss in a rigorous fashion. More generally, the approach suggested here illus-
trates that it is possible to establish conceptual links between seemingly disparate
fields such as modal logic and critical theory, thus affording social theorists a level of
precision of language and discourse that was previously unavailable to them.
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Social Possibility and Theories of
Society
It was Prince Bismarck who noted, more than a century ago, that politics is the art of
the possible. Conceptually, Prince Bismarck's venerable utterance is as much a way of
thinking about possibility as it is a conception of politics. However, there can seem to
be a troubling circularity in this joint conception of politics and possibility: If politics
is ultimately the instrumental means by which we come to know or understand what
is possible in a particular social order, then what precisely is "politics"? Moreover,
assuming that a reasonable definition of politics is somehow within reach, how should
such a definition inform our understanding of what is possible in society? Clearly,
our understanding of society and politics both informs and shapes our conceptions
of, and approaches to, the notion of social possibility. The preceding chapters put
forth a conception of social possibility that draws upon key concepts and results from
possible worlds semantics and modal logics of knowledge. In this thesis, we have
sought to probe the relevance and applicability of these concepts to modern social-
theoretic discourse and analysis. Thus far, we have concerned ourselves mostly with
the formal and mechanical elements of the proposed interplay between the abstract,
logical framework put forth previously, and the broader conceptual frame in which
it rests. In this chapter, we begin by rethinking the notion of social possibility, and
question the manner and degree to which the notion of social possibly can potentially
broaden and inform our conceptualization and understanding of what is perceived as
"feasible" or "realistic" in social or political discourse. Next, we probe the theoretical
implications of drawing the formal distinction made earlier between the actual and
the possible in social-theoretic discourse and analysis. In particular, we ask to what
extent, or in what sense, can we take possible social worlds to exist? Having probed
the cognitive status of the notion of possible social worlds, we then consider some of
the problems that underlie modern social theory's efforts to appraise social possibility,
and we explore the relevance of these ideas for transformative politics. Finally, we
touch briefly upon the inherent problems faced by social agents in moving from the
possible to the probable in transformative politics. In our discussion, all of these
issues are evaluated and considered in light of recent social thought, with particular
emphasis on Roberto Unger's Politics [34, 35].
4.1 Social Possibility Reconsidered
It is, perhaps, an all-too-common feature of everyday social and political discourse
that agents express what can seem to be an apparent interest and enthusiasm in ex-
ploring alternatives to the prevailing social order or status quo, all the while deploring
the lack of real alternatives in politics.
Generally, what is viewed as "feasible" or "realistic" in politics can be seen to
fall into one of two possible extremes. At one extreme, there are those initiatives
or proposals that are thought to lie far away or remote from current experience or
practice. The perceived remoteness of such proposals inevitably leads social agents
to reject or cast them aside on the grounds that they are little more than utopian
dreams. At the other extreme, there are initiatives or proposals that are thought to
entail small, perhaps incremental, changes in the prevailing social order. Such step-
wise approaches to social or political transformation are often denounced or derided
as being little more than reformist tinkerings which, ultimately, are unlikely to affect
much in the way of large-scale, cumulative change.
What is taken as possible in society and politics depends, in large measure, upon
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our understanding of social and phenomenal experience, combined with what are
perhaps our deepest and most profound conceptions of how civil society should be
organized. As Roberto Unger argues, "no ideas ... about possibility ... can be defined
or even understood outside the setting of a particular view of how things happen in a
particular time and place" [35, p. 173]. In this way, the notion of social possibility is
necessarily context-bound. If, as Unger argues, the notion of social possibility is little
more than a "short-hand allusion" to particular explanatory theories and modes of
explanation, then, taken outside the realm of experience, this abbreviated form of
explanation loses much-if not all-of its useful connotation and meaning. In this
way, Unger is correct in noting that statements or propositions about social possibility
gain their "sense and meaning from the particular explanatory theories to which they
implicitly refer" [35, p. 174].
This line of reasoning suggests that our characterization of the notion of social
possibility must go further in providing a telling account of how the idea of possible
social worlds can potentially give rise to intentional action and social transformation.
In our discussion thus far, we have said only that the notion of social possibility is
a useful heuristic for describing what is potentially realizable in a particular social
order. In order to arrive at a more robust, well-defined conception of the notion of
social possibility, our characterization of possible social worlds must seek to address
what is actually being described, and how social agents arrive at such judgements in
the first place. These are two issues to which we now turn.
4.2 The Actual and the Possible in Society
As typically construed, the notion of social possibility is premised on the simple
intuition that social reality can be in any number of possible states, one of which is
the state of the actual world. In this way, the true state of affairs in a particular social
order is but one of a number of possible social worlds. Despite the intuitive appeal
of this view of social possibility, it is not without both conceptual and pragmatic
difficulties. For instance, this conception of social possibility suffers from an inherent
I
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ambiguity and vagueness, stemming, ultimately, from difficulties surrounding the
cognitive and ontological status of possible social worlds. In particular, the question
of whether possible social worlds exist-even if only in some limited or restricted
sense-is, in many ways, central to our conceptions of, and approaches to, the notion
of social possibility and its potential use in social-theoretic discourse and analysis.
In addressing this issue, we begin by considering what is perhaps the most vexing
problem facing the notion of social possibility, namely, to what extent, or in what
sense, can we take possible social worlds to exist? David Lewis provides the following
pragmatic response to this question:
I believe there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit.
If an argument is wanted, it is this: It is uncontroversially true that things
might have been otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that
things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this
mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways
things could have been besides the way that they actually are. On the
face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there
exist many entities of a certain description, to wit, 'ways things could
have been,' I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; taking the
paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities
which might be called 'ways things could have been.' I prefer to call them
'possible worlds' [22, p. 84].
For our purposes here, it is useful to rephrase Lewis' words by speaking of "the way
things can potentially be," rather than "the way things could have been."
The distinction between the actual and the possible in society naturally leads us to
inquire as to what it is that differentiates or demarcates the actual from the possible
in society. From a pragmatic perspective, it seems difficult to construe possible social
worlds as concrete particulars that interact in a spatiotemporal fashion with the
phenomenal world. As Robert Stalnaker notes, "no one thinks that other possible
worlds are literally 'out there' in space ... " [32, p. 49].
I
Chapter 4. Social Possibility and Theories of Society
In what sense, then, can possible social worlds be said to exist? We may, for in-
stance, reasonably assert that what differentiates our social world-the actual world-
from other possible social worlds is, quite simply, that we are "here" and not "there" [32].
However, the intuition that underlies this view may not go far enough in specifying
whether possible social worlds are the same sorts of things as the actual world. And
while an extreme realist position about possible social worlds seems difficult to defend
in pragmatic terms, we must still confront the rather problematic issue of how social
agents come to have knowledge and insight about such worlds? If possible social
worlds are, in some sense, causally disconnected from social agents, then how can
they ever know anything about these worlds? Stalnaker summarizes this problem as
follows:
If the truth or falsity of our modal claims depends on the existence of
things and events which are causally disconnected from us, then even the
simplest claims about what is possible are unverifiable speculations [32,
p. 49, emphasis added].
If, in this way, our simplest claims about social possibility are really nothing more
than "unverifiable speculations," then what can be said about our ability to judge the
reasonableness or realism of programmatic theories or proposals that seek, ultimately,
to enlarge our conception or perception of what is socially possible? Clearly, there are
no hard and fast answers to this line of questioning. If, however, we wish to salvage
some portion of the intuition that underlies the "here" vs. "there" distinction made
earlier, it is possible to side with Lewis in holding that possible worlds differ "not in
kind, but only in what goes on at them" [22, p. 85]. Under this view, the forcefulness
or realism of programmatic proposals turns primarily on the degree to which the
arguments that support such proposals are able to convey a sense of what it is that
"goes on" at these possible social worlds. To this end, programmatic proposals must
possess clear and tangible links to the concerns, interests, and pursuits of the social
agents in question.
These considerations lead us to conclude that possible social worlds are not, as
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Stalnaker puts it, "a particular kind of thing or place," but rather a contingent feature
of the actual world [32]. In this way, possible social worlds do not exist independently
of human action, experience, or thought. Rather, they are derived, at least in part,
from our capability to remake society. To hold otherwise is to posit the existence of
a closed list or domain from which social agents take their visions of what is possible
in a particular social order.
4.3 Transformative Politics and the Appraisal of
Social Possibility
The foregoing discussion suggests that any reasonable conception of social possibility
begins, at a base level, with an affirmation that things can be otherwise than they are.
This disavowal of pre-written scripts and closed lists of alternatives and possible social
worlds leads agents to consider new and different ways for construing and ordering
social experience and society. To this end, programmatic social theory seeks to probe
the implications and the limits of ideas and conceptions about what is possible in
society.
These well-motivated aims and aspirations notwithstanding, effecting change within
an established social order is rarely a simple matter. The pushing and probing that
transformative politics necessarily entails inevitably encounters various levels of resis-
tance, in that the institutions and systems of belief that comprise a particular social
order are, to varying degrees, anchored or entrenched. Naturally, the entrenchment
of beliefs, formative contexts, and institutions renders any attempts to revise these
structures inherently problematic, if not altogether unrealizable.
Despite the problem of entrenchment, the pushing of social and political bound-
aries is, nevertheless, a necessary part of our attempts to continually broaden and
refine our sense of what is possible in society and politics. By seeking to broaden and
refine our sense of social possibility, we cease to view social and political structures
as being immutable and unrevisable. As Unger puts it,
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unless we occasionally move at the edge of our imaginative capabilities we
cannot hope to extend our vision of reality and to refine our conception
of how things may be ordered [35, p. 87].
Movement of this sort, along the periphery of social and phenomenal experience,
always entails a certain degree of experimentalism. Intrinsic to this idea of experimen-
talism-and the learning that experimentalism almost invariably gives rise to-is the
related idea that increased social and political experimentation does not come without
incurring certain risks. As Unger cautiously points out,
There is no sure way to tell which of those alternatives has the best long-
run potential. Though some alternatives are either more promising or
more accessible than others, there is no good way to define the class of
possible alternatives or evolutionary trajectories, even for a particular
society at a particular moment in its history [35, p. 100].
As discussed earlier, the notion of social possibility is, by its very nature, defined
in terms of the here and now. The appraisal of social possibility is therefore always a
positional matter. Consequently, we can never divorce the appraisal of social possi-
bility from theory or context. It is the context-dependent and theory-laden nature of
the appraisal of social possibility that Unger aptly alludes to when he speaks of the
"conditionality of worlds."
The inevitable conditionality of social worlds ultimately leads us to seek alterna-
tive modes of inquiry, description, and explanation in social thought. Clearly, the
demise in this century of positivist social science and the view of history as a ready-
made script radically alters our conceptions of individual and collective action, social
organization, and transformative politics. Social theory's collective disavowal and
rejection of ready-made scripts has lead to a conceptual understanding of society and
politics that is in sharp contrast to what Unger calls deep-logic analysis. Deep-logic
analysis proceeds from the assumption that, at any one time, there are constraints
that uniquely determine which social worlds are possible and which social worlds are
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impossible. In this way, deep-logic analysis spells out the logical conditions under
which possible social worlds become actual [35].
Naturally, it is possible to reject the tenets of deep-logic analysis on the grounds
that such conceptions of society and politics place unrealistic restrictions on human
potential and what is taken to be socially possible. By asserting emancipation from
what Unger calls "false necessity," we are able, as he puts it, "to affirm that things
can be otherwise" [35, p. 145].
How, then, in light of these considerations, should the realism and feasibility
of programmatic proposals and strategies for social or political transformation be
judged? Or, stating the question somewhat differently, in what sense is it meaningful
to enquire as to the manner and the degree to which our systems of belief, social
frameworks, and institutional orderings influence our wants and preferences, as well
as our assessments or determinations of what is socially possible?
In approaching this line of questioning, we begin by noting that not all beliefs are
on par with one another. Social agents may, for any number of reasons, believe some
propositions more than others and, moreover, they may be more committed to some
beliefs than others. Having made this observation, we recognize that, within a par-
ticular social order, some beliefs, formative contexts, and institutional arrangements
are more deeply entrenched than others. Clearly, the more entrenched that particular
beliefs, formative contexts, and institutions are, the more difficult they are to revise
or transform. The obvious corollary to this view is, as Unger affirms, that "when
formative contexts become more disentrenched, their influence over their own sequels
... diminish" [35, p. 157].
This characterization suggests that one possible approach to assessing or judging
the realism or feasibility of programmatic proposals is to give explicit consideration
to the degrees of entrenchment that are associated with the specific beliefs, formative
contexts, and institutional arrangements that characterize a particular social order.
Ultimately, these varying degrees of entrenchment have an important bearing on what
is abandoned, what is retained, and what is put up for grabs in society and politics.1
10Operationally, our assessment of the entrenchment of one formative context relative to another
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Naturally, the actual degree to which particular beliefs, formative contexts, and
institutional arrangements are entrenched depends, in large measure, upon the man-
ner in which social and political life is organized and understood. At a base level,
these structures are reflective of what has proven successful in past approaches to
social decision-making, experimentation, organization, and problem solving. In this
way, as Robin Lovin argues, formative contexts reduce the "infinite possibilities to
realities of a particular social order" [23, p. 9].
4.4 Moving From the Possible to the Probable in
Transformative Politics
How social agents, in effect, decide what is abandoned, what is retained, and what
is put up for grabs in transformative politics is clearly dependent upon a number of
interrelated factors, not the least of which are the interests, desires, and collective
engagements of the agents in question.
Actual movement from one set of beliefs, formative contexts, or institutional order-
ings to another is a precarious affair, in that such development and evolution rarely, if
ever, follows a predetermined script. Rather, in moving from one formative context to
another, each formative context influences the scope and character of new contexts,
rather than uniquely determining them according to some predefined script. This
characterization is in sharp contrast with the type of deep-logic analysis described
previously, where future possible social worlds are logically determined by the past.
And while no institutional ordering is ever neutral with respect to its preferences
(either explicit or implicit) among different forms of experience and understanding,
the influence that one formative context exerts on another is reasonably construed as
being a matter of degree, rather than as something that is inherently deterministic
is fundamentally premised on the idea that some beliefs and contexts are more useful than others
for human inquiry and decision-making. The notion of entrenchment, in its most general sense, is
often tied to issues relating to the explanatory power and information value of causal explanations
and predictive theories. For technical discussions of the notion of epistemic entrenchment, see, e.g.,
Gilrdenfors [11] and Levi [20].
Chapter 4. Social Possibility and Theories of Society
Chapter 4. Social Possibility and Theories of Society
in character.
Our ability to discern and track the sequential effects of formative contexts is
inherently problematic, especially in light of the radical contingency of institutional
arrangements. Unger characterizes this problem in terms of the influence that each
formative context exerts on its own sequel. He writes:
This sequential influence never determines particular outcomes. At most
it makes certain lines of transformation more likely than others. Given
the complexity of the circumstances involved in each instance of con-
text change and the difficulty of comparing such instances, we have little
prospect of ever being able to quantify these probabilities. ... an element
of prediction is required for the intellectual guidance of transformative
practice [34, p. 313, emphasis added].
Conceptually, then, we have moved from possibility to probability in our charac-
terization of transformative politics. In making this conceptual shift, we arrive at a
potentially powerful means by which to judge the reasonableness and forcefulness of
programmatic proposals. Unger is correct in pointing out, however, that this char-
acterization is problematic, if only because it is rarely a simple matter to reliably
estimate the probabilities in question. Our efforts to quantify these uncertainties
can be frustrated or thwarted for any number of reasons. Social agents may, for in-
stance, lack the knowledge and information necessary to arrive at reliable probability
assessments. In this regard, social agents are likely to face any number of practical
constraints, such as the accessibility, availability, and cost(s) of obtaining what may
be relevant or specific knowledge and information. More generally, issues relating
to human ignorance and bounded rationality are also likely to impose fundamental
constraints on the degree to which agents are able to reliably quantify such values.
In general, social agents must confront the basic fact that there always exists a ten-
sion between the scope of transformative action and the depth of the time horizon
in which such action is ultimately expected to play out. Intuitively, the larger the
scope, and the longer the time horizon, the more difficult it is to arrive at reliable es-
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timates of the transition probabilities that underlie any sort of directional movement
in transformative politics.
Despite these difficulties, the notions of possibility and probability play important
roles in the ways that we conceive and approach programmatic social theory and
transformative politics. At a foundational level, both concepts can be seen to underlie
our very understanding of utopian thought. As William Galston observes, utopian
visions serve a markedly evaluative function in our attempts at context revision and
transformative action. Utopias, says Galston, "exist in speech; they are cities of
words" [10, p. 18]. Nonetheless, utopian thought must, as a matter of practical
necessity, be constrained by possibility. This is a view that Galston clearly embraces
in the following passage:
Utopia is realistic in that it assumes human and material preconditions
that are neither logically nor empirically impossible, even though their
simultaneous presence may be both unlikely and largely beyond human
control to effect [10, p. 18].
Realism in utopian thought is ultimately seen, therefore, to be a function of social
possibility. Without some measure of realism, utopian thought loses its usefulness
as a guide for human deliberation and action. As Galston argues, "we may long for
the impossible, but we choose and act in the belief that our goal is possible" [10, p.
18]. John Dunn sides with this view in asserting that "what is likely to happen is
almost always more important to a human agent than what just conceivably might
happen" [7, p. 84, emphasis added].
4.5 Summary
The preceding discussion has sought to further our understanding of the notion of so-
cial possibility. In particular, the theoretical conception of social possibility sketched
in this chapter has sought to probe the underlying foundations of the logical frame-
work put forth previously in Chapter 2. The end-result of our theorizing suggests
that while a logical framework for social possibility provides a potentially useful and
convenient means by which to represent social-theoretic statements and propositions,
such a framework constitutes only a first step towards a more general and compre-
hensive theory of social possibility that seeks, ultimately, to inform individual and
collective action, as well as transformative politics.
A logical framework such as the one set forth in this thesis is clearly an impor-
tant prerequisite for such a theory of social possibility. It must be stressed, however,
that while formal logic may provide a compact and systematic means by which to
represent abstract social-theoretic concepts and propositions, abstract logical systems
are, by themselves, sterile and devoid of tangible links between agents and the social
universe that they inhabit. A central challenge in contemporary social-theoretic dis-
course and analysis remains one of arriving at conceptual schemes and frameworks
that allow social scientists to capture the diverse range of human agency and insti-
tutional patterns. The potential for creative interplay that exists between abstract
laws, analytical frameworks, and conceptual schemes represents a promising avenue
for the advancement of modern social theory.




In this thesis, I have sought to cast the notion of social possibility in several different
lights. In so doing, I have sought to highlight the centrality of the notion of social
possibility in the foundations of modern social-theoretic discourse and analysis. The
conception of social possibility advanced here establishes a formal link between specific
aspects of modern social thought that are often thought to be at considerable odds
with one another. Drawing, first, upon results from possible worlds semantics and
modal logics of knowledge, the thesis demonstrates how these formal methods can
be used to reason systematically about social possibility and the epistemic states of
social agents. More generally, by grounding the notion of social possibility in an
epistemic context, the thesis has sought to lend credence to the rejection of visions
of society and humankind that are founded upon naive forms of social determinism,
under which rigid constraints are placed on the types of social organizations that are
deemed possible by societies and the agents that ultimately play out the dramas of
human experience.
In our efforts to arrive at alternative conceptions of social possibility and, in
the process, to reimagine and remake society, we cannot be blind to the fact that
antinecessitarian approaches to social theory such as the one suggested here do not,
by themselves, preclude the possibility of constraints and influences that, in effect,
dominate formative contexts and institutional orderings. History seems to support the
claim that while such constraints can potentially be changed, resolved, or otherwise
Chapter 5. Conclusion
successfully negotiated, it is rarely a simple matter to actualize such change and
transformation in the real world. For this reason, programmatic social theory and
transformative politics require for their success-perhaps above all else-a heroic
blend of passion, insight, discipline, coordination, shared commitment, and trust.
By affirming that social worlds can be remade, the notion of social possibility is
divorced from references or allusions to predetermined scripts or "invisible hands." In
seeking to arrive at both plausible and useful accounts of how social worlds get remade,
social theorists must continue to make strides towards identifying and characterizing
the inherent complexities and difficulties faced in moving from one institutional or
imaginative context to another. Our quest for broader conceptions of social possibil-
ity and transformative politics must ultimately lead us to abandon the necessitarian
assumptions of traditional approaches to social and political discourse. With this
abandonment should come new conceptions and approaches to social description, ex-
planation, and prediction. By eschewing naive social determinism, we can therefore
begin to seek disentrenchment-however slight-from the binding and restricting so-
cial and epistemological contexts that pervade almost every aspect of ordinary human
experience.
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